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ABSTRACT 
We add to previous research on fundamental analysis by investigating why and how specific 
signals provide value-relevant information under different conditions. Our analysis provides 
empirical support for predictions about the value-relevance of various signals based on either 
providing information about future sales growth or about the efficiency of the business in using or 
consuming resources to generate sales. We demonstrate how specific signals are differentially 
informative in sales-increase versus sales-decrease periods. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fundamental analysis is a technique applied to determine the value of corporate securities 
by examining key value-drivers such as earnings, growth, and competitive position. It uses 
information found in financial statements to gain insights about a company’s future performance. 
Previous studies have analytically and empirically investigated the value relevance of broad sets 
of fundamental signals (Brown, 1993; Ou and Penman, 1989; Lipe, 1986; Ou, 1990; Lev and 
Thiagarajan, 1993; Nissim and Penman, 2001; Abaranell and Bushee, 1997, 1998; Greig, 1993; 
Dechow et al., 2001), but have not provided in-depth conceptual and empirical analysis of 
individual signals with an objective of learning why and how specific signals convey incremental 
information about future earnings and firm value. Because many fundamental signals are based on 
changes in sales, a relevant question is whether the signals are differentially informative when 
sales increase and when sales decrease. We describe and test predictions about specific 
fundamental signals using an empirical specification that discriminates between sales-increase and 
sales-decrease observations. We draw inferences from the results of this estimation for evaluating 
the information provided by various signals. 
Fundamental signals are value-relevant if they convey information to investors that alters their 
expectations about future cash flows. Changes in earnings themselves are value-relevant and other 
signals are incrementally value-relevant to earnings changes if they provide additional information 
that is useful for predicting future operating earnings in relation to invested capital. Many 
fundamental signals relate changes in resources used or consumed to changes in sales. These 
signals may be informative in two ways – they may provide information about expected demand 
for the company’s products that causes investors to update their expectations of future sales growth 
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or they may provide information about resource utilization that causes investors to update their 
prior beliefs about resource usage or consumption in relation to sales. 
We incorporate the direction of sales change into fundamental analysis because incentives for 
managing resources, information conveyed by management actions and performance outcomes 
differ with circumstances that are indicated by the direction of sales change in the current period. 
For instance, a sales increase suggests new opportunities and optimism while a sales decrease 
suggests potential problems or difficulties in selling products. When sales increase, an increase in 
accounts receivable relative to sales may indicate good news because it suggests that managers are 
confident and are wisely strengthening customer relationships by offering competitive payment 
terms, When sales decrease, lower cuts in accounts receivable relative to sales may indicate bad 
news if this relation reflects management efforts to bolster sales by relaxing credit terms unwisely. 
 When sales increase, investors look for evidence indicating whether the increase is persistent 
and if the growth is likely to continue, and, when sales decrease, they look for information to help 
them assess whether the decrease is temporary and what the likely duration of a downturn is. When 
sales increase, a greater proportionate increase in SG&A expenses relative to current sales may 
indicate investment aimed at generating future benefits or it may reveal that marginal growth is 
costly. When sales decrease, failure to reduce SG&A spending proportionately may indicate 
ineffective resource management while, on the other hand, continuing to spend on SG&A may 
reflect optimism about a turnaround (Anderson et al, 2007). Thus, the information conveyed to 
investors by signals may be different when evaluating firms experiencing sales increases versus 
decreases. We investigate whether and how the direction of sales change affects the information 
provided by the signals used in fundamental analysis. 
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For a sample of 60,693 firm-year observations from 1985 to 2015, we describe and test 
predictions about specific fundamental signals, which, in addition to change in earnings per share 
(EPS), include signals based on capital expenditures, accounts receivable, inventory, property, 
plant and equipment (PP&E). sales per employee, gross margin, selling, general and administrative 
(SG&A) costs, and audit opinion. Our analysis and results are useful for sorting out the types of 
information conveyed by individual signals. The relations we find between stock returns and 
signals based on capital expenditures relative to industry, accounts receivable turnover, and sales 
per employee are in line with these signals providing information about future sales growth.  The 
relations between stock returns and signals based on PP&E turnover, gross margin and SG&A to 
sales are in line with these signals providing information about the efficiency of the business in 
using and consuming resources in relation to sales. We also document that signals based on 
changes in EPS, capital expenditures, accounts receivable, sales per employee, PP&E turnover, 
gross margin, and audit opinion are differentially informative about expected future firm 
performance for sales-increasing firm-year observations versus sales-decreasing observations.  
In the next section, we review the literature on fundamental analysis as it pertains to our 
study. In Section III, we use a valuation framework to make predictions about the incremental 
information provided by specific signals and develop our hypothesis that signals may provide 
differential information when sales increase versus when sales decrease. In Section IV, we describe 
the methodology and sample data. In Section V, we present the empirical results. In Section VI, 
we conclude by summarizing our findings and discussing implications.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Fundamental analysis involves a careful examination of a firm’s activities and prospects based 
on publicly available financial reports as well as other sources of information concerning the firm, 
the markets in which it competes, and the overall economic environment (Bauman, 1996). A 
primary objective of fundamental analysis is to gain insights about a company’s future 
performance through information provided in financial statements. Findings by Lev and 
Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997, 1998) indicate that fundamental signals are 
value-relevant, and that analysts must search for information from these signals in order to assess 
the value of a firm.  
Investors can use information in financial statements to forecast earnings for the reporting 
entity, estimate the risk of these earnings, and ultimately make an assessment of the intrinsic value 
of the firm that can be compared to observed market prices (Richardon, Tuna, and Wysocki, 2010). 
Piotroski (2000) demonstrates that a simple accounting-based fundamental analysis strategy, when 
applied to a broad portfolio of high book-to-market firms, can shift the distribution of returns 
earned by an investor. Mohanram (2005) shows that a fundamental analysis-based approach, 
appropriately tailored for low book-to-market firms, is successful in differentiating between 
winners and losers in terms of ex-post stock returns. Similarly, Mohanram, Saiy, and Vyas (2017) 
provide evidence supporting the usefulness of such an approach to provide insights for analyzing 
U.S. banks.  
Analysts generally attach a specific interpretation to a fundamental signal (e.g., a 
disproportionate increase in inventory conveys bad news). However, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) 
point out that a signal used in fundamental analysis may have different implications for future 
earnings under different circumstances and highlight the importance of performing conditional 
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fundamental analysis. Deakin (1977) comments that interpretation of the results of using financial 
data in predicting corporate failure must be considered in light of the nature of the process a 
company follows leading to the failed state. Poston, Harmon, and Gramlich (1994) point out that, 
although prior studies have proved the usefulness of accounting-based variables to predict 
corporate performance, they ignore the fact that these variables may have different predictive 
power for a financially healthy firm and a firm that is facing difficulties at a point in time. Beneish 
et al. (2001) examine the usefulness of contextual fundamental analysis for the prediction of 
extreme stock returns. They show that accounting-based fundamental variables are more useful in 
separating losers from winners among the subset of predicted extreme performers, and predicted 
extreme winners earn substantially higher returns than predicted extreme losers. Mohanram (2005) 
suggests that the fundamental analysis-based trading strategy identified by Piotroski (2000) is less 
successful in low book-to-market firms than for high book-to-market firms. These studies illustrate 
the usefulness of conditioning fundamental analysis on context. 
In this regard, there is an increasing volume of literature that examines differences in cost 
behavior (how costs change in relation to changes in sales) between sales-up and sales-down 
periods. This asymmetry in cost behavior results from managers’ decisions to retain or release 
resources when demand falls (Anderson, Banker, and Janakiraman, 2003). Banker and Chen 
(2006) demonstrate that an earnings prediction model that discriminates between sales-up and 
sales-down periods outperforms other models. Anderson et al. (2007) base their analysis of the 
SG&A cost signal on sticky cost behavior – that managers deliberately retain resources that are 
not required to support a reduced level of sales activity if they are optimistic about future sales. 
They find that future earnings are negatively related to the change in the SG&A cost to sales ratio 
in sales-increasing periods, but positively related to the change in the SG&A cost ratio in sales-
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decreasing periods. Thus, the interpretation of the SG&A signal in fundamental analysis may be 
conditioned on the direction of the change in sales (up or down).  
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) suggest that the direction of firm-specific earnings news may 
affect the interpretation of some signals. They find that the accounts receivable signal provides 
positive information for future earnings in good news (an increase in earnings relative to the prior 
year) years, as opposed to the predicted direction, and the gross margin and SG&A signals are 
informative only in the bad news (an earnings decline from the prior year) years. Compared with 
the direction of change in earnings as a condition used by Abarbanell and Bushee (1997), the 
direction of change in sales is a more primitive indicator of varying conditions under which 
managers make decisions in response to changes in demand and sales volume. 
 
III. FUNDAMENTAL SIGNALS 
We follow the literature on fundamental analysis (Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993; Abarbanell and 
Bushee, 1997, 1998) to identify nine fundamental signals: signals based on earnings per share, 
capital expenditures, accounts receivable, inventory, property, plant and equipment, sales per 
employee, gross margin, SG&A expenses, and audit opinion.1 Because previous research was 
interested in the broader question whether fundamental analysis provided value-relevant 
information, limited attention was given to the questions why and how specific fundamental 
signals were value-relevant. Predictions about the signs on individual signals were based on 
commonly accepted interpretations ascribed to financial analysts. We take a step back and consider 
why specific fundamental signals may provide value-relevant information. 
                                                             
1 We don’t use earnings quality based on LIFO because it is no longer relevant. We exclude effective tax 
rate because it constrains our sample. 
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A financial signal conveys value-relevant information when it alters investor expectations 
about the amout, timing and uncertainty of current and future cash flows. A change in earnings is 
value-relevant because it provides information about current cash flows and causes investors to 
update their expectations about future cash flows. Other financial signals are incrementally 
informative to a change in earnings if they cause investors to modify their expectations about future 
cash flows conditional on current earnings. 
In a discounted cash flow valuation model that uses operating earnings to proxy for operating 
cash flows (see, for instance, Penman, 2013), entity value is the present value of future free cash 
flows based on assumptions about four parameters over time: sales growth, net operating asset 
turnover (NOAT), net operating profit margin (NOPM), and the discount rate. This valuation 
framework is useful for describing how fundamental signals provide value-relevant information. 
NOAT relates sales to net operating assets and measures the investment in various resources used 
to support sales. NOPM relates sales to operating costs and measures the reources consumed to 
generate sales. Three of the nine signals identified above are directly related to NOAT because 
they represent resources that are key components of net operating assets: the receivables signal 
measures the change in receivables relative to the change in sales, the inventory signal measures 
the change in inventory relative to the change in sales, and the PP&E signal measures the change 
in PP&E relative to the change in sales. Two of the nine signals are directly related to NOPM 
because they represent resources that are consumed in the generation of sales: the gross margin 
signal relates the change in the cost of goods sold to the change in sales and the SG&A signal 
relate the change in selling, general and administrative costs to the change in sales. Another signal, 
the sales to employees signal, relates the change in human resources to the change in sales. Thus, 
six of the nine signals relate changes in resources used or consumed to changes in sales. 
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These signals may provide information that alters investors’ expectations about the resources 
required to support or generate sales – NOAT or NOPM, or they may provide information that 
affects investors’ expectations about future sales growth. The latter is less direct but important 
because changes in resource usage or consumption may reflect information about managers’ 
expectations about future sales. For example, an increase in SG&A costs relative to sales may 
indicate ramping up in order to meet a higher level of future sales. We discuss these types of 
information with respect to each of the signals below. The fundamental signals described below 
are summarized in Appendix I. 
Earnings per Share (∆EPS) 
The earnings per share signal is defined as the change in EPS relative to the previous year, 
scaled by the beginning stock price. An increase in EPS is favorable as it indicates higher 
profitability in the current period and suggests higher profitability in future periods. Large 
literatures in accounting support the value-relevance of earnings changes and the impact of a 
change in earnings on the time series of earnings. As with previous research in fundamental 
analysis, we include the EPS signal as a base-line signal and investigate how other signals provide 
incremental information to the change in EPS. We note, however, that we discriminate between 
sales-increase and sales-decrease periods for the EPS signal just as for other signals. A change in 
EPS when sales increase may have different value implications than a change in EPS when sales 
decrease.                                                                                                                                                      
Capital Expenditure (CAPX) 
The capital expenditure signal is defined as the difference between the annual percentage 
change in the firm’s capital expenditures and the percentage change in the corresponding two-digit 
industry capital expenditures. An increase in the capital expenditure signal indicates more 
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investment in long-term assets to fund new projects relative to industry peers. This is favorable 
information for firm’s future performance as it implies that the firm has the confidence and 
financial ability to invest in itself through capital expenditures. Under this traditional 
interpretation, the predicted sign on the coefficient is positive (the coefficient refers to the 
coefficient on the value of the signal in an empirical model that relates changes in firm value to 
the signals). An alternative is that the company is overinvesting in itself by unwisely investing at 
a rate greater than its industry peers. Under this alternative interpretation, the predicted sign on the 
coefficient is negative. 
The observed coefficient reflects the balance between the two explanations. When sales are 
increasing, the weight on the traditional intepretation is likely to be stronger than it is when sales 
are decreasing. Conversely, when sales are decreasing, the weight on the alternative interpretation 
is likely to be stronger than it is when sales are increasing. Investing at a higher rate than peer 
firms when the company is losing sales is likely to be less favorable than investing at a higher rate 
when the company is gaining sales. 
Accounts Receivable (AR) 
The accounts receivable signal is defined as the difference between the annual percentage 
change in sales and the percentage change in receivables. Under the traditional interpretation (Lev 
and Thiagarajan 1993), receivables’ growth that is faster than growth of sales indicates bad news. 
Under this interpretation, increases in accounts receivable relative to sales suggest that the 
company has difficulties in selling its products (generally triggering credit extensions), and there 
is an increasing likelihood of future earnings decreases from increases in receivables’ provisions. 
In this case, the signal has a negative value and the predicted sign on the coefficient is positive. 
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In contrast, however, an increase in accounts receivable relative to sales may suggest that 
management expands credit to increase future sales and earnings, as argued and evidenced by 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997). Under this alternative interpretation of the accounts receivable 
signal, increases in accounts receivable are considered as an investment in customer relations, and 
thus a favorable signal. Because the value of the signal is negative when receivables are increasing 
faster than sales (or falling slower than sales), the predicted sign on the coefficient under the 
alternative intepretation is negative. 
Again, the observed coefficient reflects the relative strength of the two competing 
explanations. If the traditional interpretation is weighted more heavily than the alternative 
interpretation, the coefficient will be positive and the converse is true. The accounts receivable 
signal when sales decrease is particularly interesting because companies may use receivables to 
bolster sagging sales unwisely (traditional) or to retain and support valued customers in a downturn 
(alternative). 
Sales per Employee (SPE) 
The sales per employee signal is defined as the annual percentage change in sales-per-
employee (the ratio of annual sales to the number of employees at year end). Under the traditional 
interpretation, a positive value of the signal (i.e., an increase in sales-per-employee relative to prior 
year) implies higher productivity and good news. Financial analysts generally comment favorably 
on announcements of corporate restructuring, particularly labor force reductions. In the year of a 
significant labor force reduction, wage-related expenses (e.g., severance pay) may increase but 
expected future labor costs decrease. Reported earnings, in such cases, do not reflect the future 
benefits from restructuring, and fundamentals such as the sales per employee signal are used to 
provide a better assessment of future earnings (Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993). Thus an increase in 
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the sales per employee ratio (the value of the signal is positive) is considered good news for future 
performance. Under the traditional interpretation, the predicted sign on the coefficient is positive. 
On the other hand, employees may be added when managers anticipate that current and future 
demand would support an increase in labor capacity. Because there may be a lag between the 
addition of employees and the realization of higher sales, a decrease in sales per employee may 
indicate manager confidence in growing sales. If the market is looking for signs of growth and 
expansion, as well as managerial confidence, this might be particularly relevant when sales are 
increasing. Oi (1962) and Becker (1975) suggest that skilled labor is a partially fixed asset of the 
company. If specifically trained employees are not laid off when there is a decline in demand, the 
firm would gain in the future if the decline in demand is temporary. Therefore, there is an incentive 
not to lay off employees with specific training (Becker 1975; Horning, 1994), or skilled employees 
which is known as “labor hoarding” (Summers, 1986; Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 1993). 
Thus, a decrease in sales per employee (the value of the signal is negative), when sales are 
declining, may indicate managers’ confidence in the future growth of the firm and their 
unwillingness to lay off employees as they are optimistic and anticipating future opportunities, and 
therefore would be considered as good news. Under this alternative interpretation, the predicted 
coefficient on the signal is negative. 
As with the previous signals, the observed coefficient reflects the relative weights on the 
traditional and alternative explanations. Because the relative weights may shift when sales decline 
as opposed to when sales increase, the magnitude of the observed coefficients may differ in sales 
decrease versus sales increase periods. For instance, the market may value improving labor 
efficiency (traditiona) as relatively more important when sales decline. 
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Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) 
The property, plant and equipment signal is defined as the difference between the annual 
percentage change in sales and the percentage change in PP&E, or equivalently the change                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
in sales per dollar invested in PP&E. A positive value of the signal (i.e., sales’ growth is greater 
than that of PP&E) implies good news due to higher productivity and capacity utilization, and 
therefore a positive relation with expected firm performance. In this case, the predicted sign on the 
coefficient is positive. 
Alternatively, growth in PP&E relative to sales may indicate that managers are expanding 
aggressively because they are confident about future demand. In this regard, PP&E differs from 
accounts receivable and employees because of the long lead time required to add new PP&E. This 
makes it important to analyze both the addition of PP&E as an outcome of long-term planning and 
the sales generated from PP&E as a realization of the anticipated demand. For this reason, we 
included the CAPX signal that measures capital expenditures relative to industry to pick up the 
growth dimension of investment in PP&E. 
As with other signals, the traditional and alternative explanations may both be valid and the 
sign on the coefficient would reflect the balance or dominance of one explanation over the other. 
For retail companies, analysts look at same-store sales to distinguish between increases in sales 
due to expansion and increase in sales due to higher productivity or capacity utilization. When 
sales decline, the value of the PP&E signal is negative if the decline in sales is greater than the 
decline in PP&E. This bad news under the traditional interpretation may be tempered by the good 
news under the alternative interpretation that the loss in sales is not due to reduction in PP&E 
itself. Also, because of the fixed nature of PP&E (adjustment takes time) and the possibility that a 
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decline in sales is temporary, investors may put less weight on a loss in productitivy reflected in a 
negative value of the signal.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Inventory (INV) 
The inventory signal is defined as the difference between the annual percentage change of 
sales and the percentage change in inventory. A positive value of the signal (i.e., sales’ growth is 
larger than that of inventory) indicates good news and a positive relation with firm performance. 
An important quality of the inventory signal is that it represents differences between realized sales 
and anticipated sales because inventory levels depend on production planning. This leads to an 
important distinction between PP&E turnover and inventory turnover from an information 
perspective because PP&E levels depend on long-run planning while inventory levels depend on 
short-run planning.  When sales increase faster than inventory levels, the implication is that 
demand is higher than expected (good news) and when inventory levels increase faster than sales, 
the implication is that demand is lower than expected (bad news). An inventory build-up suggests 
difficulties in generating sales, and earnings are expected to decline as management attempts to 
lower inventory levels. A build-up also suggests the existence of slow-moving or obsolete items 
that will be written off in the future. The value-relevance of an inventory build-up may be more 
acute when sales decline. 
For inventory, the traditional interpretation is based on the information obtained from the 
signal about demand and future sales growth. This is different from receivables, employees and 
PP&E where the alternative interpretations reflected information obtained from the signal about 
future sales growth. However, the information comes from realized sales relative to inventory 
levels as opposed to changes in inventory levels to accommodate future sales. An alternative 
interpretation of the inventory signal would be that the company has become more efficient in 
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using inventory to generate sales. For instance, the company may have implemented a just-in-time 
inventory system or enhanced its production planning in other ways to reduce inventory levels. In 
this case, the predicted sign on the coefficient would also be positive so there is not the same type 
of distinction between the predicted signs for the traditional and alternative interpretations as there 
is for the other signals. 
Gross Margin (GM) 
The gross margin signal is defined as the difference between the percentage change in gross 
margin and that of sales. A positive value of the signal (i.e., an increase in the gross margin as a 
percentage of sales), implies good news, and therefore a positive relation with firm performance. 
Gross margin is affected by both pricing and the cost of goods sold. Thus, it reflects a 
combination of the market demand for the firm’s products and the efficiency of the firm’s 
production processes. From a strategic perspective (Porter ??), differentiation of the firm’s 
products, on dimensions such as quality and product features, enables the firm to charge higher 
pries while cost leadership (production excellence) enables the firm to produce at lower costs, 
relative to competitors. A higher gross margin is desirable as it suggests a greater potential for 
earning larger profits. Businesses with higher gross margin are better equipped against 
unanticipated increases in the cost of production or competition. A decrease in gross margin is 
viewed negatively as poor sales performance (declining demand) will typically lead to lower gross 
margins. From a valuation perspective, gross margin is directly related to NOPM. If the market 
believes that an increase in gross margin is sustainable, it will reward the company. Thus, under 
the traditional interpretation, the predicted sign on the coefficient for gorss margin is positive. 
An alternative interpretation of changes in the gross margin percentage is that companies use 
pricing to gain or retain market share. This may be more relevant when sales decline – companies 
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may discount their products to retain their market position, but could also be relevant when sales 
are growing if a company is pricing aggressively to ward off competition. Under the alternative 
interpretation, a decline in gross margin may be valuable if it provides positive information about 
sales growth. Because the coefficient observed represents the balance between the traditional and 
alternative explanations, the coefficient when sales decline may be lower than the coefficient when 
sales increase due to the likelihood that companies are discounting their products when sales 
decline. 
SG&A Expenses (SG&A) 
The SG&A expenses signal is defined as the difference between the annual percentage change 
in sales and the percentage change of SG&A expenses. A positive value of the signal (i.e., sales’ 
growth is larger than that of SG&A expenses) implies good news because the company is using 
its SG&A resources more effectively, and therefore a positive relation with firm performance. 
Conversely, a disproportionate (to sales) increase in SG&A expenses is considered a negative 
signal as the increase suggests inefficiency and inability of managers to control costs (Lev and 
Thiagarajan, 1993). Thus, under the traditional interpretation, a positive coefficient is predicted. 
However, SG&A expenses have both an investment component that aims at discovering new 
products and technologies and a maintenance component that supports current operations (Enache 
and Srivastava, 2017). Therefore, disproportionate increases in SG&A expenses may indicate 
either increases in investment or decreases in efficiency, or both. So, the alternative interpretation 
of the SG&A signal is that an increase in SG&A costs in proportion to sales (SG&A costs growing 
faster than sales) may represent greater investment in the future and indicate managers’ confidence 
in future sales growth. This may occur when sales increase or when sales decline. The predicted 
coefficient under the alternative interpretation is negative. 
16 
 
Audit Opinion (AO) 
The audit opinion signal is given a value of 1 if the auditor’s opinion is unqualified, and 0 for 
other opinions. The signal with a value of 1 implies good news, and therefore a positive relation 
with firm performance.  
A qualified or adverse audit opinion obviously sends a negative massage to investors. Dopuch, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) documented a significant negative stock price reaction to 
qualified audit opinions. The market may be more sensitive to information about accounting 
quality for sales-increasing firms because investors are expecting a clean audit opinion for such 
firms. 
The table below summarizes the predicted coefficients under the traditional and alternative 
interpretations of the various signals. 
 
Predicted Coefficients under Tradtional and Alternative Interpretations 
  Sign 
of the 
signal 
Interpretation of the signal  
(expected coefficient) 
Signal  Traditional Alternative 
CAPX 
CAPX growing faster (falling 
slower) than industry + Good news (+) Bad news (-) 
CAPX growing slower 
(falling faster) than industry - Bad news (+) Good news (-) 
Accounts 
Receivable 
Sales growing faster (falling 
slower) than receivables + Good news (+) Bad news (-) 
Sales growing slower (falling 
faster) than receivables 
 
- Bad news (+) Good news (-) 
Inventory 
Sales growing faster (falling 
slower) than inventory + Good news (+) Good news (+) 
Sales growing slower (falling 
faster) than inventory - Bad news (+) Bad news (-) 
PP&E 
Sales growing faster (falling 
slower) than PP&E + Good news (+) Bad news (-) 
Sales growing slower (falling 
faster) than PP&E - Bad news (+) Good news (-) 
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Sales per 
Employee 
Sales growing faster (falling 
slower) than employees + Good news (+) Bad news (-) 
Sales growing slower (falling 
faster) than employees - Bad news (+) Good news (-) 
Gross 
Margin 
Gross margin growing faster 
(falling slower) than sales + Good news (+) Bad news (-) 
Gross margin growing slower 
(falling faster) than sales - Bad news (+) Good news (-) 
SG&A 
SG&A expenses growing 
faster (falling slower) than 
sales 
+ Good news (+) Bad news (-) 
SG&A expenses growing 
slower (falling faster) than 
sales 
- Bad news (+) Good news (-) 
Audit 
Opinion 
Unqualified 
  Good news (+)  
Qualified and other 
  Bad news (+)  
 
Previous research has shown the importance of conditioning fundamental analysis on factors 
such as earnings change (Abarbanell and Bushee, 1997) and book-to-market ratio (Piotroski, 2000; 
Mohanram, 2005). We investigate how the direction of sales change in the current period affects 
the information provided by the signals (Anderson et al., 2007). Banker and Chen (2006) 
demonstrate that an earnings prediction model that incorporates the direction of the sales change 
is better in capturing the earnings generating process than other models. In addition, management 
practices differ between upturns and downturns of businesses and such differences have a strong 
influence on firm performance (Bromiley, Navarro and Sottile, 2008; Navarro, Bromiley and 
Sottile, 2010). As indicated in our discussion of various signals, the relative weights on the 
traditional and alternative interpretations may differ in sales-increasing versus sales-decreasing 
periods. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1 (H1): Fundamental signals are differentially informative between firms 
experiencing an increase in sales relative to the prior period and those experiencing a decrease 
in sales. 
 
IV. SAMPLE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample Data 
We obtain the accounting data from COMPUSTAT annual files for North American firms 
and stock return data from the Centre for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly files.. We 
winsorize the data based on the top and bottom 1% for each variable in our analysis. We exclude 
from the sample financial services firms (SIC 6000-6999) because of differences in interpreting 
financial reports between these industries and other industries (Subramanyam, 1996). Firms with 
sales revenue, absolute book value of equity, or market value of equity less than $1 million are 
excluded from the sample. Our final sample contains 60,693 firm-year observations covering the 
years from 1986 to 20152.  
Methodology 
Following Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), we relate the one-year and two-year size-adjusted 
buy-and-hold returns (RET1 or RET2) to fundamentals that are based on current earnings change 
(∆EPS), capital expenditure (CAPX), accounts receivable (AR), sales per employee (SPE), 
property, plant and equipment (PP&E), inventory (INV), gross margin (GM), SG&A expenses 
(SG&A), and audit opinion (AO).  !"#1%,' is defined as the 12-month buy-and-hold returns of firm i in year t with the period 
starting from the beginning of the fourth month of year t through the third month of year t + 1 (Lev 
                                                             
2 The sample period includes 2015 because our measure of returns requires two-year ahead data. 
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and Thiagarajan 1993). Starting the cumulation period at the beginning of the fourth month 
accommodates the release of quarterly financial information and annual financial statements 
during the return period. !"#2%,' is defined as the 24-month buy-and-hold returns of firm i in year 
t with the period starting from the beginning of the fourth month of year t through the third month 
of year t + 2. Both RET1 and RET2 are size-adjusted by subtracting the mean returns in the same 
period for the same capitalization decile as the firm on CRSP (Mohanram 2005). If the firm is 
delisted, the delisting return is used if available. Definitions of the fundamental signals are 
presented in Appendix I. 
To investigate whether fundamental signals are differentially informative between firms 
experiencing an increase or decrease in sales, we first estimate a baseline regression for the full 
sample. We estimate the model in equation (1). !"#%,' = * + ∑ -.,%,'/012345.,%,'6.78 + 9%,'                                                                                    (1) 
where 
RET is RET1 or RET2 and Signals are the nine fundaemtnal signals of interest. We then estimate 
equation (1) separately for firms experiencing an increase and firms experiencing a decrease in 
sales in the current period relative to the previous period. 
Next, to test whether signals are differentially informative in sales-up and sales-down periods, 
we estimate model (2) below with a dummy variable indicating the direction of the change in 
sales.3 !"#%,' = * + :;<=;35;_:?@@A + ∑ -%,.,'/012345.,%,'6.78 + :;<=;35;_:?@@A	 ×	∑ -.,%,'/012345.,%,'8D.78E +	9%,'               (2) 
where 
                                                             
3 Estimating model (2) is redundant to estimating the seprate regressions but facilitiates the analysis. 
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Decrease_Dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if there is a decrease in sales in the 
current period relative to the prior period, and zero if there is an increase.  
We first adopt a year-by-year OLS regression approach using Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-
step procedure for model (1). We then use the panel regression approach with firm fixed effects 
for estimating models (1) and (2), controlling for year fixed effects.  
Variance inflation factors (VIF’s) are calculated for each independent variable (see Neter et 
al. 1985, pp. 390-393). All of the VIF’s were less than 3 (indicating no serious multicollinearity). 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics for the full sample are presented 
in panel A of Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the sales-increasing subsample are presented in 
panel B and for the sales-decreasing subsample are presented in panel C of Table 1. Panel D 
compares the mean of variables and signals between sales-increasing and sales-decreasing 
subsamples. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
There are more firms that experienced an increase in sales than a decrease. Firms that had an 
increase in sales had much higher earnings per share (EPS), more sales and inventory, higher gross 
margin and SG&A expenses, more employees, lower PP&E and assets, and higher one-year and 
two-year returns than firms that had a decrease, on average. 
A comparison of the signals between the two conditions (see Panel D of Table 1) is useful for 
setting the background for our analysis. The EPS signals that measures the EPS growth rate has a 
higher mean value of 0.027 for sales-increasing than that of 0.003 for sales-decreasing firms. The 
capital expenditures signal that measures whether new CAPX is higher for the firm than for its 
industry peers has a mean value of 0.397 for sales-increasing firms, which is significantly larger 
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than that of sales-decreasing firms (0.038). The accounts receivable signal that measures whether 
receivables are growing faster than sales, has a mean value of -0.017 for sales-increasing firms, 
which is higher than that of sales-decreasing firms (-0.073). The sales per employee signal that 
measures whether the sales per employee are increasing relative to prior year has a mean value 
0.121 for sales-increasing firms, and it is larger than that for sales-decreasing firms (-0.040). The 
PP&E signal that measures whether sales are growing faster than PP&E has a mean value of 0.097 
for sales-increasing firms, which is significantly greater than that of sales-decreasing firms (-
0.052). The inventory signal that measures whether sales are growing faster than inventory has a 
mean value of 0.021 for sales-increasing firms, which is higher than that for sales-decreasing firms 
(-0.081). The gross margin signal that measures whether sales are growing faster than cost of goods 
sold has a mean value of 0.004 for sales-increasing firms, which is larger than that for sales-
decreasing firms (-0.024). The SG&A signal that measures whether sales are growing faster than 
SG&A costs has a mean value of 0.058 for sales-increasing firms, and it is higher than that for 
sales-decreasing firms (-0.095). The audit opinion signal that indicates whether the firm has an 
unqualified audit opinion or not is also significantly higher for sales-increasing firms than sales-
decreasing firms (0.739 versus 0.698).4 
Panel E provides the proportion of firm-year observations that has an increase in sales versus 
a decrease. Observations that have a sales increase account for 72.75 percent of the sample, and 
sales decrease observations account for 27.25 percent.  
                                                             
4 Auditor’s opinion on a company’s financial statements includes unaudited, unqualified, qualified, no opinion, 
unqualified with additional language, and adverse opinion in the Compustat data. Unqualified opinion accounts for 
about 70% of all opinions of the sample. Thus about 30% of audit opinions are made up of the remaining five 
opinions including qualified opinion. 
22 
 
Table 2 provides correlations among all the variables and signals used in the empirical 
analysis. All the signals are significantly and positively correlated with one-year and two-year 
returns except for the accounts receivable signal, which is negatively correlated with the returns.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tables 3 provides results of year-by-year estimation of model (1) for the full sample. Most of 
the yearly coefficients of the EPS, CAPX, PP&E, inventory, gross margin, S&A expenses, and 
audit opinion signals are positive, and most of the yearly coefficients of the accounts receivable 
and sales per exmployee signals are negative. For most years, these coefficients are also 
statistically significant. The across-years significance test based on Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-
step procedure indicates that all the signals are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Tables 4 provides panel regression results of model (1) for the full sample and for the two 
subsamples based on the direction of sales change of the current period t.  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
We observe that, for the full sample reported in column (1), the EPS, CAPX, PP&E, inventory, 
gross margin, SG&A expenses, and audit opinion signals are all significantly and positively related 
to one-year returns. These results are consistent with the Fama-MacBeth results and support the 
traditional interpretations of these signals: CAPX that is higher for the firm than for its industry 
peers, sales growth that is larger than the growth of PP&E, sales growing faster than inventory, 
sales growing faster than SG&A expenses, and gross margin growing faster than sales, are 
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favorable indicators for the firm’s stock market performance. Not surprising, both an increase in 
EPS and receiving an unqualified audit opinion are also favorable. 
On the other hand, the accounts receivable and sales per employee signals are significantly 
and negatively related to one-year returns. This indicates that receivables growing faster (or falling 
slower) than sales and a decrease in sales per employee are favorable signals. These results are 
consistent with the alternative interpretations of the accounts receivable signal (Abarbanell and 
Bushee, 1997) and the sales per employee signal. In both cases, the alternative interpretation 
indicates that the signal provides information about expected future growth in sales, suggesting 
that investment in accounts receivable and addition of new employees are leading indicators of 
future sales growth. 
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3 report results of estimating model (1) separately for current 
sales increase and sales decrease subsamples of year t. For the firms that had an increase in sales, 
∆EPS (- = 0.674, p < 0.01), capital expenditure (- = 0.016, p < 0.01), PP&E (- = 0.133, p < 0.01), 
inventory (- = 0.014, p < 0.05), gross margin (- = 0.083, p < 0.01), SG&A expenses (- = 0.158, 
p < 0.01), and audit opinion (- = 0.029, p < 0.01) signals are significant and positively related to 
one-year returns, and the accounts receivable (- = -0.044, p < 0.01) and sales per employee (- = 
-0.121, p < 0.01) signals are negatively related to one-year returns. The negative sign on accounts 
receivable and sales per employee signals suggests that, when sales increase, a larger increase 
receivables and in the number of employees is favorable for the company’s future performance. 
For firms that had a decrease in sales, the ∆EPS (- = 0.378, p < 0.01), PP&E (- = 0.085, p < 
0.01), inventory (- = 0.036, p < 0.05) gross margin (- = 0.065, p < 0.01), and SG&A expenses (- 
= 0.215, p < 0.01) signals are positively related to one-year returns and the accounts receivable (- 
= -0.071, p < 0.01) and sales per employee (- = -0.052, p < 0.05) signals are negatively related to 
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the returns, which suggests that when sales decrease, a smaller decrease in receivables and 
management’s unwillingness to let go of their employees (“labor hoarding”) is favorable for the 
company’s performance.  
Table 5 provides estimation results of model (2) with an indicator for sales decrease (D). The 
results provide the same information as the separate regression results in Table 4, but the 
coefficients on the variables interacted with the sales decrease dummy indicate differences in the 
value change associated with signals between sales-increasing and sales-decreasing conditions in 
year t.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
We observe that the incremental coefficients on ∆EPS (-  = -0.282, p < 0.01), capital 
expenditures (- = -0.008, p < 0.10), PP&E (- = -0.040, p < 0.10), gross margin (- = -0.033, p < 
0.05), and audit opinion (- = -0.024, p < 0.05) signals interacted with the sales decrease indicator 
(D) are significantly negative. For the ∆EPS signal, this indicates that the value change associated 
with a change in EPS when sales decrease is less than the value change associated with a change 
in EPS when sales increase. There are a number of possible reasons for this. For instance, the 
earnings change when sales increase may be more persistent than the earnings change when sales 
decrease. Or the smaller coefficient may reflect higher downward elasticity of earnings when sales 
decrease due to cost fixity or cost stickiness. 
For the capital expenditures, PP&E, and gross margin signals, the negative incremental 
coefficient indicates that the strength of the traditional interpretation versus the alternative 
interpretation is smaller when sales decrease. For CAPX, the traditional interpretation is that an 
increase in capital spending relative to industry peers is a good sign about future sales and the 
alternative interpretation is that an increase in spending relative to industry peers indicates 
25 
 
overinvestment. So the balance may swing more towards the alternative interpretation when sales 
are declining. In other words, the optimism about the company’s CAPX may be reduced when 
sales are falling. For PP&E, the traditional interpretation is based on higher capacity utilization 
being a good sign whereas the alternative interpretation is that growing sales faster than PP&E 
may indicate that managers are less confident in future growth so they are investing less in new 
PP&E – the company may be moving from the growth stage to the mature stage of its life-cycle. 
Again, the balance may swing towards the alternative interpretation when there is a decline in sales. 
For gross margin, the smaller coefficient when sales are falling indicates that investors do not value 
a drop in margin when sales decline as much as they value an increase in margin when sales 
increase. If companies are discounting to retain customers when sales decline, this may be viewed 
favorably. 
Surprisingly, the incremental coefficient is significantly negative for the accounts receivable 
(- = -0.046, p < 0.01) signal. Given that the coefficient is negative when sales increase, this means 
that the alternative interpretation is given more weight when sales decline than when sales increase. 
This suggests that extending additional credit to retain old customers or obtain new ones when 
sales are declining is an even stronger indicator of manager’s confidence than when sales increase. 
This runs opposite to the earnings management prediction that managers may use credit unwisely 
to prop up earnings when sales are declining. The incremental coefficient on the sales per employee 
signal is significantly positive (- = 0.062, p < 0.05), indicating that the relative strength of the 
alternative interpretation is smaller when sales decrease – the market does not value the addition 
of new employees or retention of employees as strongly or puts relatively greater weight on the 
information conveyed by the signal about efficiency (traditional interpretation) when sales decline. 
26 
 
Overall, the results support H1, that fundamental signals, specifically ∆EPS, capital 
expenditures relative to industry, accounts receivable turnover, sales per employee, PP&E turnover 
and audit opinion, are differentially informative for firms with an increase versus a decrease in 
sales. With regard to audit opinion, one might expect that a clean opinion should be more valuable 
when sales are declining. Perhaps the market is more concerned about the integrity of financial 
reporting when sales are increasing.  
We replace one-year returns (RET1) with two-year returns (RET2) as the dependent variable 
in the analysis of model (1) and (2), and the results are reported in Table 6 and 7.5 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Some of the signals lose power when we go from one-year to two-year returns but overall the 
signals remain strong. The CAPX signal is weaker and the accounts receivable signal is not 
significant when sales increase. The incremental results for the accounts receivable and sales per 
employee signals remain strong (see table 7). The incremental coefficient for the SG&A signal is 
significantly positive for the 2-year return (it was not significant for the one year return).  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our study contributes in two main ways to the fundamental analysis literature. First, it 
provides a more comprehensive discussion and description of the roles of individual signals than 
is found in the previous literature. In this regard, it considers both traditional and alternative 
intepretations for individual signals. We find that the alternative interpretations are stronger for 
the accounts receivable and employees to sales signals whereas the traditional interpretations are 
                                                             
5 We also conduct year-by-year regressions of model (1) and (2) using Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-step 
procedure, the results are similar to those using a panel regression approach. 
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supported for the other signals. Second, it examines and illustrates how conditioning fundamental 
analysis on the direction of sales change may be useful. The description of traditional and 
alternative interpretations is useful for this part because it helps to explain why there are different 
value weights (coefficients) placed on some signals when sales decline versus when sales increase. 
Our study also has implications for investors. Investors may be able to better utilize the 
information provided by fundamental signals and develop a more thorough understanding of the 
firm’s financial position if they partition the signals according to the direction of the sales change. 
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Appendix I Definition and measurement of variablesa 
Variables (Signals) Measured as 
One-Year Size-Adjusted Returns (!"#1%,') Size-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting from the beginning of the fourth month 
of year t through the third month of year t + 1 
Two-Year Size-Adjusted Returns (!"#2%,') Size-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for the 24-month period starting from the beginning of the fourth month 
of year t through the third month of year t + 2 
Earnings per Share (∆EPS)  EPS	("epspx")Q,R − EPSQ,RT8Stock	price	(prcc_f)Q,RT8  
Capital Expenditure (CAPX) ∆Firm	CAPX	("capx") − ∆Industry	CAPXb  
Accounts Receivable (AR) ∆Sales	("sale") − ∆Accounts	receivable	("rect")  
Sales per Employee (SPE) j klmnop,q#stumvwnno("ntu")p,q − klmnop,qxy#stumvwnnop,qxyz klmnop,qxy#stumvwnnop,qxy{   
Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E) ∆Sales − ∆PP&E	("ppent")  
Inventory (INV) ∆Sales − ∆Inventory	("invt")  
Gross Margin (GM) ∆Gross	margin	("sale" − "cogs") − ∆Sales  
SG&A Expenses (SG&A) ∆Sales − ∆SG&A	expenses	("xsga")  
Audit Opinion (AO) 1	for	Unqualified, 0	for	Qualified	or	other	("auop")  
a Adapted from Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997, 1998). 
b Industry capital expenditure is measured by aggregating this item for all firms at the two-digit SIC code 
level. 
∆ refers to percentage annual change in the variable from the prior year. The signals are defined such that their 
expected relation with stock returns is positive.  
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full sample (N = 60,693) 
Variables        Mean   P10    P25     P50         P75       P90         S.D. 
EPS  0.933 -0.790 0.010 0.660 1.590 2.830 24.257 
Sales  2,674.455 26.830 80.894 313.231 1,328.552 4,886.800 12,352.140 
Inventory  271.072 1.998 7.640 32.056 146.800 530.342 1,128.775 
Accounts Receivable  402.805 1.674 3.408 10.506 164.708 589.253 4,789.288 
Capital Expenditures  161.458 0.659 2.641 12.841 63.453 261.781 859.016 
PP&E  925.468 3.163 12.104 60.737 345.800 1,490.348 5,090.586 
Gross Margin  874.130 9.315 27.873 104.233 427.094 1,548.591 3,913.503 
SG&A Expenses  473.651 7.477 19.401 62.986 235.861 839.400 2,133.615 
# of Employees  10.166 0.142 0.419 1.575 6.300 21.300 43.343 
Total Assets  2,850.126 26.307 75.891 291.413 1,297.442 4,892.116 15,179.46 
One-Year Returns  -0.002 -0.474 -0.288 -0.083 0.155 0.521 0.480 
Two-Year Returns  0.008 -0.611 -0.407 -0.150 0.188 0.752 0.694 
         
Signals         ∆EPS  0.021 -0.094 -0.025 0.005 0.032 0.124 0.210 
Capital Expenditures  0.299 -0.562 -0.279 0.026 0.442 1.207 1.248 
Accounts Receivable  -0.032 -0.358 -0.128 0.005 0.130 0.308 0.457 
Sales per Employee  0.077 -0.157 -0.041 0.042 0.135 0.298 0.292 
PP&E  0.057 -0.250 -0.095 0.019 0.140 0.339 0.359 
Inventory  -0.007 -0.353 -0.126 0.013 0.149 0.352 0.441 
Gross Margin  -0.004 -0.151 -0.053 0.001 0.053 0.160 0.413 
SG&A Expenses  0.251 -0.185 -0.068 0.002 0.074 0.209 0.251 
Audit Opinion  0.728 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.445 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Sales increase (N = 44,153) 
Variables        Mean   P10    P25     P50         P75       P90         S.D. 
EPS  1.293 -0.370 0.180 0.860 1.770 3.010 26.641 
Sales  2,750.058 30.296 89.657 340.759 1,395.891 5,001.435 12,633.990 
Inventory  277.117 2.118 8.071 33.837 154.090 540.000 1,172.241 
Accounts Receivable  385.892 3.723 11.400 42.720 172.132 593.000 4,234.970 
Capital Expenditures  160.439 0.795 3.118 14.443 67.500 268.687 789.459 
PP&E  891.269 3.430 12.970 63.705 349.605 1,461.492 4,598.322 
Gross Margin  908.639 11.204 31.913 116.805 459.972 1,618.467 3,992.317 
SG&A Expenses  489.109 7.893 20.549 66.489 248.000 871.983 2,195.590 
# of Employees  10.722 0.157 0.461 1.716 6.650 22.101 46.799 
Total Assets  2,772.804 28.337 81.795 306.781 1,318.377 4,829.750 13,925.890 
One-Year Returns  0.028 -0.442 -0.258 -0.055 0.186 0.556 0.481 
Two-Year Returns  0.021 -0.598 -0.391 -0.133 0.206 0.760 0.687 
         
Signals         ∆EPS  0.027 -0.049 -0.011 0.008 0.034 0.109 0.165 
Capital Expenditures  0.397 -0.498 -0.212 0.093 0.540 1.376 1.310 
Accounts Receivable  -0.017 -0.352 -0.118 0.014 0.145 0.350 0.484 
Sales per Employee  0.121 -0.084 0.000 0.068 0.165 0.346 0.296 
PP&E  0.097 -0.193 -0.053 0.049 0.173 0.387 0.359 
Inventory  0.021 -0.333 -0.100 0.033 0.178 0.401 0.469 
Gross Margin  0.004 -0.137 -0.045 0.004 0.054 0.165 0.427 
SG&A Expenses  0.058 -0.117 -0.035 0.021 0.103 0.259 0.260 
Audit Opinion  0.739 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.439 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Panel C: Sales decrease (N = 16,540) 
Variables        Mean   P10    P25     P50         P75       P90         S.D. 
EPS  -0.025 -1.770 -0.540 0.110 0.930 2.160 16.223 
Sales  2,472.633 20.479 60.828 248.435 1,154.036 4,612.5 11,564.100 
Inventory  254.935 1.733 6.659 27.461 129.067 495.111 1,003.422 
Accounts Receivable  447.955 2.751 8.347 33.112 147.802 577.353 6,024.107 
Capital Expenditures  164.177 0.429 1.702 8.978 52.095 242.891 1,021.784 
PP&E  1,016.761 2.579 9.963 52.330 333.132 1,586.443 6,215.843 
Gross Margin  782.008 6.229 18.946 74.258 339.347 1,350.835 3,693.423 
SG&A Expenses  432.388 6.614 16.674 53.874 205.315 738.415 1,958.057 
# of Employees  8.682 0.113 0.323 1.259 5.300 18.800 32.318 
Total Assets  3,056.534 22.559 62.365 251.093 1,226.748 5,064.500 18,104.490 
One-Year Returns  -0.082 -0.539 -0.362 -0.156 0.064 0.398 0.468 
Two-Year Returns  -0.027 -0.640 -0.447 -0.196 0.133 0.722 0.712 
         
Signals         ∆EPS  0.003 -0.216 -0.081 -0.019 0.022 0.192 0.296 
Capital Expenditures  0.038 -0.673 -0.422 -0.140 0.181 0.704 1.022 
Accounts Receivable  -0.073 -0.366 -0.151 -0.019 0.092 0.218 0.371 
Sales per Employee  -0.040 -0.278 -0.140 -0.042 0.036 0.139 0.244 
PP&E  -0.052 -0.350 -0.189 -0.065 0.031 0.167 0.334 
Inventory  -0.081 -0.390 -0.184 -0.039 0.075 0.216 0.343 
Gross Margin  -0.024 -0.182 -0.075 -0.008 0.051 0.150 0.372 
SG&A Expenses  -0.095 -0.305 -0.160 -0.061 0.004 0.070 0.182 
Audit Opinion  0.698 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.459 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Panel D: Univariate descriptive statistics conditional on the direction of sales change 
 Mean 
Variables Sales Increase Sales Decrease Test for Difference 
EPS 1.293 -0.025 5.964*** 
Sales 2,750.058 2,472.633 2.464** 
Inventory 277.117 254.935 2.156** 
Accounts Receivable 385.892 447.955 -1.421 
Capital Expenditures 160.439 164.177 -0.477 
PP&E 891.269 1,016.761 -2.704*** 
Gross Margin 908.639 782.008 3.550*** 
SG&A Expenses 489.109 432.388 2.916*** 
# of Employees 10.722 8.682 5.165*** 
Total Assets 2,772.804 3,056.534 -2.050** 
One-Year Returns 0.028 -0.082 25.212*** 
Two-Year Returns 0.021 -0.027 7.621*** 	    
Signals    ∆EPS 0.027 0.003 12.659*** 
Capital Expenditures 0.397 0.038 31.791*** 
Accounts Receivable -0.017 -0.073 13.471*** 
Sales per Employee 0.121 -0.040 62.354*** 
PP&E 0.097 -0.052 46.505*** 
Inventory 0.021 -0.081 25.772*** 
Gross Margin 0.004 -0.024 7.323*** 
SG&A Expenses 0.058 -0.095 69.751*** 
Audit Opinion 0.739 0.698 10.024*** 
***, **, * denote p-value at or below 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, based on a t-test for mean. 
 
Panel E: Distribution of the direction of sales change 
 Frequency Percentage 
Sales Increase 44,153 72.75% 
Sales Decrease 16,540 27.25% 
Total 60,693 100.00% 
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Table 2 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variables 
(Signals) 
One-Year 
Returns 
Two-
Year 
Returns ∆EPS CAPX AR SPE  PP&E INV GM SG&A AO 
One-Year Returns 
 
1           
Two-Year Returns 0.676 1          
 (0.000)           ∆EPS 0.259 0.197 1         
 (0.000) (0.000)          
CAPX 0.051 0.020 0.005 1        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.179)         
AR -0.023 -0.008 0.007 -0.020 1       
 (0.001) (0.052) (0.103) (0.000)        
SPE 0.050 0.024 0.090 0.054 0.248 1      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
PP&E 0.104 0.081 0.124 -0.164 0.193 0.580 1     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
INV 0.050 0.037 0.057 -0.019 0.209 0.371 0.321 1    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
GM 0.086 0.065 0.113 -0.001 -0.038 -0.060 -0.074 0.003 1   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.790) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.401)    
SG&A 0.141 0.087 0.206 0.062 0.122 0.520 0.485 0.253 -0.108 1  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
AO 0.043 0.044 -0.005 0.045 -0.003 -0.005 -0.015 -0.001 0.014 0.006 1 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.227) (0.000) (0.190) (0.190) (0.000) (0.866) (0.000) (0.138)  
Numbers in parentheses are p-values.  
 
37 
 
Table 3 Coefficient estimates of year-by-year regressions 
Year EPS CAPX 
Accounts 
Receivable 
Sales per 
Employee PP&E Inventory 
Gross 
Margin 
SG&A Audit Opinion Intercept N 
1986 0.371***  0.022*** 
-0.005 -0.168***  0.125*** -0.020 0.052**  0.261***  0.142*** -0.163*** 1,656 
1987 0.406***  0.051*** 
-0.069*** -0.054  0.055*  0.013 0.008***  0.153***  0.149*** -0.174*** 1,706 
1988 0.305***  0.030*** 
 0.003 -0.050  0.015  0.031 0.098***  0.215***  0.068*** -0.067*** 1,753 
1989 0.653***  0.046*** 
-0.057** -0.056  0.083**  0.081*** 0.071***  0.286***  0.069*** -0.069*** 1,724 
1990 0.619***  0.034*** 
-0.029 -0.009  0.120***  0.014 0.041  0.196***  0.103*** -0.107*** 1,740 
1991 0.383***  0.055*** 
-0.083*** -0.283***  0.203***  0.011 0.178***  0.430***  0.023 -0.061** 1,785 
1992 0.690***  0.024*** 
-0.066** -0.263***  0.246***  0.017 0.074***  0.227***  0.046** -0.105*** 1,896 
1993 0.560***  0.030*** 
-0.002 -0.095**  0.118***  0.008 0.107***  0.137***  0.051*** -0.061*** 2,056 
1994 0.597***  0.031*** 
-0.045** -0.208***  0.176***  0.037 0.047*  0.321***  0.046** -0.021 2,193 
1995 0.682***  0.030*** 
-0.114*** -0.066  0.187*** -0.028 0.075**  0.190***  0.021 -0.056*** 2,275 
1996 0.730***  0.051*** 
-0.035* -0.170***  0.181***  0.026 0.102***  0.158*** -0.001 -0.033 2,321 
1997 0.616***  0.025*** 
 0.017 -0.127***  0.092***  0.005 0.087***  0.144***  0.080** -0.113*** 2,389 
1998 0.543***  0.017** 
-0.005 -0.151***  0.162***  0.062** 0.051*  0.221***  0.078** -0.145*** 2,319 
1999 0.659***  0.051*** 
-0.125*** -0.009  0.259*** -0.081** 0.047  0.273***  0.146*** -0.208*** 2,146 
2000 0.655*** -0.022** 
-0.083*** -0.207***  0.107**  0.093*** 0.023  0.049  0.150*** -0.088** 2,075 
2001 0.469***  0.028*** 
-0.108*** -0.303***  0.297***  0.066** 0.140***  0.140***  0.083*** -0.013 2,057 
2002 0.471***  0.028*** 
 0.025 -0.007 -0.020  0.028 0.054**  0.158***  0.037** -0.106*** 2,100 
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2003 0.503***  0.034*** 
-0.026 -0.123**  0.213*** -0.064** 0.002  0.222***  0.036 -0.026 2,141 
2004 0.560***  0.000 
-0.001  0.017 -0.051*  0.016 0.160***  0.096** -0.013  0.014 2,126 
2005 0.625***  0.017** 
-0.062*** -0.035  0.075**  0.014 0.082***  0.262***  0.071*** -0.060*** 2.126 
2006 0.427***  0.021*** 
-0.008 -0.109***  0.169***  0.024 0.139***  0.120***  0.076*** -0.032*** 2,103 
2007 0.533***  0.020** 
-0.076***  0.063  0.039  0.017 0.110***  0.193***  0.079*** -0.028** 2,041 
2008 0.430***  0.004 
-0.048** -0.117**  0.093**  0.038 0.072***  0.100*  0.078*** -0.093*** 2,060 
2009 0.582*** -0.042*** 
-0.073** -0.093  0.051  0.026 0.052*  0.067  0.014  0.029 2,045 
2010 0.328***  0.028*** 
-0.081***  0.000  0.047  0.015 0.075***  0.167***  0.071*** -0.058*** 1,997 
2011 0.467***  0.008 
-0.010 -0.116***  0.026 -0.011 0.139***  0.115**  0.032 -0.048** 1,972 
2012 0.409***  0.025*** 
-0.001 -0.085**  0.134***  0.006 0.185***  0.178***  0.081*** -0.083*** 1,958 
2013 0.375***  0019** 
-0.048** -0.003  0.160***  0.059** 0.151***  0.099*  0.014  0.028 1,948 
2014 0.360***  0.018** 
0.009 -0.112**  0.019  0.069*** 0.107***  0.123***  0.054 -0.076** 1,986 
2015 0.382***  0.022*** 
0.027 -0.057  0.085***  0.056*** 0.058*** -0.034  0.071*** -0.113*** 1,999 
Across-
Years 
Meansa 
0.513*** 
(0.022) 
 0.024*** 
(0.004) 
-0.039*** 
(0.008) -0.097*** 
(0.017) 
 0.116*** 
(0.015) 
 0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.086*** 
(0.009) 
 0.176*** 
(0.016) 
 0.065*** 
(0.008) 
-0.071*** 
(0.010) 
 
# Positive 30 28 
5 2 28 25 30 29 28 3  
# Negative 0 2 
25 28 2 5 0 1 2 27  
a Results are from year-by-year regressions computed based on Fama-MacBeth (1973) two-step procedure. The coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are the average across years. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4 Regression results 
 One-Year Returns (!"#$%,') 
Variables (Signals) (1) Full Sample (2) Sales Increase (3) Sales Decrease ∆EPS  0.515***  0.674***  0.378*** 
  (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.023) 
CAPX  0.017***  0.016***  0.007 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Accounts Receivable -0.044*** -0.034*** -0.071*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.015) 
Sales per Employee -0.092*** -0.121*** -0.052** 
  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.024) 
PP&E  0.121***  0.133***  0.085*** 
  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.019) 
Inventory  0.019***  0.014**  0.036** 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.018) 
Gross Margin  0.082***  0.083***  0.065*** 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.015) 
SG&A  0.177***  0.158***  0.215*** 
  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.031) 
Audit Opinion  0.031***  0.029***  0.018 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.011) 
Intercept -0.055*** -0.032** -0.073*** 
  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.025) 
    
N 60,693 44,153 16,540 
R2 0.096 0.090 0.119 
Results are from panel regressions for the full sample (Column (1)), sales increase sample 
(Column (2)) and sales decrease sample (Column (3)). The coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are the average across years. 
The testing period is from 1985 to 2014. 
Both year and firm fixed effects are controlled. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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Table 5 Regression results with sales change indicator 
One-Year Returns (!"#$%,') 
Variables (Signals) (1) Sales Increase Variables (Signals) 
(2) Sales 
Decrease 
Incremental ∆EPS  0.672*** ∆EPS*D -0.282*** 
  (0.026)   (0.033) 
CAPX  0.016*** CAPX*D -0.008* 
  (0.002)   (0.005) 
Accounts Receivable -0.035*** Accounts Receivable*D -0.046*** 
  (0.006)   (0.016) 
Sales per Employee -0.124*** Sales per Employee*D  0.062** 
  (0.014)   (0.026) 
PP&E  0.126*** PP&E*D -0.040* 
  (0.012)   (0.021) 
Inventory  0.016** Inventory*D  0.013 
  (0.007)   (0.017) 
Gross Margin  0.083*** Gross Margin*D -0.033** 
  (0.008)   (0.016) 
SG&A  0.147*** SG&A*D  0.012 
  (0.016)   (0.031) 
Audit Opinion  0.035*** Audit Opinion*D -0.024** 
  (0.006)   (0.010) 
Intercept -0.043*** Decrease Dummy (D) -0.043*** 
  (0.012)   (0.008) 
    
N   60,693 
R2   0.103 
Results are from panel regressions for sales increase sample (Column (1)) and interactions of 
fundamental signals and sales decrease dummy (Column (2)). 
The sales increase sample is the reference group, meaning that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms represent the differences in the coefficients between the sales-increasing and 
sales-decreasing periods. 
The testing period is from 1985 to 2014. 
Both year and firm fixed effects are controlled. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), 
respectively.  
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Table 6 Regression results 
 Two-Year Returns (!"#)%,') 
Variables (Signals) (1) Full Sample (2) Sales Increase (3) Sales Decrease ∆EPS  0.547***  0.718***  0.393*** 
  (0.022)  (0.034)  (0.029) 
CAPX  0.001  0.007* -0.006 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
Accounts Receivable -0.025*** -0.014 -0.063*** 
  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.018) 
Sales per Employee -0.135*** -0.155*** -0.022 
  (0.016)  (0.020)  (0.031) 
PP&E  0.147***  0.173***  0.129*** 
  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.026) 
Inventory  0.028***  0.027***  0.015 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.027) 
Gross Margin  0.078***  0.076***  0.103*** 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.018) 
SG&A  0.108***  0.096***  0.299*** 
  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.044) 
Audit Opinion  0.025***  0.020**  0.014 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.017) 
Intercept -0.040** -0.020  0.000 
  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.039) 
    
N 60,693 44,153 16,540 
R2 0.053 0.055 0.084 
Results are from panel regressions for the full sample (Column (1)), sales increase sample 
(Column (2)) and sales decrease sample (Column (3)). The coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are the average across years. 
The testing period is from 1985 to 2014. 
Both year and firm fixed effects are controlled. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
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Table 7 Regression results with sales change indicator 
Two-Year Returns (!"#)%,') 
Variables (Signals) (1) Sales Increase Variables (Signals) 
(2) Sales 
Decrease 
Incremental ∆EPS  0.695*** ∆EPS*D -0.273*** 
  (0.033)   (0.044) 
CAPX  0.005 CAPX*D -0.013* 
  (0.003)   (0.007) 
Accounts Receivable -0.013 Accounts Receivable*D -0.063*** 
  (0.008)   (0.018) 
Sales per Employee -0.162*** Sales per Employee*D  0.096*** 
  (0.019)   (0.035) 
PP&E  0.158*** PP&E*D -0.029 
  (0.016)   (0.028) 
Inventory  0.031*** Inventory*D -0.013 
  (0.009)   (0.025) 
Gross Margin  0.074*** Gross Margin*D  0.005 
  (0.011)   (0.019) 
SG&A  0.087*** SG&A*D  0.103** 
  (0.020)   (0.044) 
Audit Opinion  0.024*** Audit Opinion*D  0.002 
  (0.009)   (0.014) 
Intercept -0.043** Decrease Dummy (D)  0.021* 
  (0.019)   (0.012) 
    
N   60,693 
R2   0.056 
Results are from panel regressions for sales increase sample (Column (1)) and interactions of 
fundamental signals and sales decrease dummy (Column (2)). 
The sales increase sample is the reference group, meaning that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms represent the differences in the coefficients between the sales-increasing and 
sales-decreasing periods. 
The testing period is from 1985 to 2014. 
Both year and firm fixed effects are controlled. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), 
respectively.  
 
 
